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In 1983, Malcolm M. Feeley published a seminal book on criminal 
court reforms in the United States: Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple 
Solutions Fail.1   Feeley presented his thesis through case studies of four 
planned innovations: bail reform, pretrial detention, sentence reform, and 
speedy trials.  He theorized that “because our understanding of the courts is 
flawed and our expectations about what the courts can do are unrealistic, many 
innovations fail.”2  According to Feeley, some fail because reformers try to 
eliminate discretion by mistaking discretion for arbitrariness.  Some are 
misdirected because reformers overreacted to horror stories when, in fact, the 
problem is fairly limited.  Others are misconceived; they are merely 
responding to symbols of legal formalisms when they should be dealing with 
actual practices.  Some strive to introduce reforms which are beyond 
capacities of the courts.  At the time of its publication, Feeley’s Court Reform 
on Trial was considered “one of the best statements of the policy science, legal 
effectiveness, and tradition within the sociology of law.”3  It has continued to 
inspire research on various areas of court reform in the United States today.4  
Is Feeley’s analytical framework applicable to court reform outside the United 
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 1  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983). This 
book was republished in 2013 with a new introduction by Greg Berman. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT 
REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (2013). 
2  FEELEY, supra note 1, at xiv. 
3  Austin Sarat, Courts and Court Reform: Which Appearances are the Most Deceiving? Review of 
Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail by Malcolm Feeley, 8 ALSA F. 454, 458 (1984) (book 
review). 
4  One of the most recent examples includes Alissa Pollitz Worden et al., Court Reform: Why Simple 
Solutions Might Not Fail? A Case Study of Implementation of Counsel at First Appearance, 14 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 521, 522 (2017) (“We frame our inquiry around Malcolm Feeley’s thesis that court reforms are 
more likely to fail than to succeed, and draw conclusions about the conditions under which such reforms are 
likely to be successful.”). 
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States?  This symposium issue is organized to tackle this question with cases 
from East Asia.  
 
 According to Feeley, the primary problem within American courts is 
that “the courts themselves have . . . fostered unrealistic expectations, and 
promoted bold but often empty solutions.”5  Such a problem arises because 
changes are often brought about by raised standards and increased attention 
from politicians, the press, and the scholarly community.  The result is 
disillusionment and disappointment even when significant improvements are 
produced.  In particular, Feeley emphasizes importance of attention to the 
fragmentation of the American criminal court in its organization, operations, 
and goals.6  The American courts are arenas in which a range of competing 
and conflicting interests collide: “[j]udges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
defendants, clerks, police officers, bailiffs, sheriffs, bondsmen, witnesses, and 
all the others . . . pursue distinctly different interests and purposes and may 
understand their participation in the process in entirely different ways.”7  Such 
fragmentation appears to make coherent implementation of introduced 
reforms particularly difficult.  Planned changes in the American court often 
fail because innovators do not understand these characteristics of 
fragmentation of the court. 
 
Feeley identified the following five stages of planned change8: 
 
1.  Diagnosis or Conception: “[t]he process of identifying 
problems and considering solutions . . . Different perspectives 
lead people to identify different problems and suggest different 
remedies.” 
 
2.  Initiation: “[n]ew functions are added or practices are 
significantly altered. This stage requires several decisions: (1) 
Which of several alternatives will be adopted? (2) How will the 
problems be financed? (3) Where will the program be located?” 
 
3.  Implementation: “[i]nvolves staffing, clarifying goals, and 
adapting to a new environment.” 
 
                                                 
5  FEELEY, supra note 1, at xiii. 
6  Id. at 9.  
7  Id. 9–10. 
8  Id. at 35–37. 
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4.  Routinization: “[i]nvolves commitment by an institution 
to supply funding and a physical base of operations. Ultimately, 
the success of an innovation must be judged by how it performs 
under this routine rather than under its initial conditions.”  
 
5.  Evaluation: “[n]ew programs are usually assessed during 
their experimental (the first three) stages rather than their routine 
periods (the fourth stage) . . . it tells us next to nothing about 
whether it will work.” 
 
In the four cases Feeley analyzed, fragmentation seems to have worked 
most strongly at the stages of implementation and routinization.  In those 
stages, fragmentation produced a result contrary to the result expected by 
those who had diagnosed the status quo and initiated the given reform.9 
  
Feeley further mentioned several characteristics of “the context of 
change.”  On the one hand, Feeley found the following characteristics which 
promote planned change:10 
 
1. Highly trained professionals who perform complex tasks. 
 
2. Diffused and flexible authority, rather than centralized authority. 
 
3.  Ambiguous duties, rather than duties formally codified in detail. 
 
4.  Flexible roles and mobility, rather than rigid roles. 
 
On the other hand, Feeley identified the following two factors that 
discourage innovation:11 
 
1.  Higher volume of production increases the need for established 
routine and lowers the incentive to change. 
 
2.  Greater emphasis on efficiency increases the likelihood that 
program change will be discouraged. 
 
                                                 
9  Id. at 36–37. 
10  Id. at 37–38. 
11  Id. at 38. 
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In relation to these innovation-impeding factors, Feeley observed that 
“courts also are enmeshed in a web of rules that can be and often are inimical 
to change.  Those comfortable with current practices selectively invoke these 
rules to impede change.”12  This would require reformers to introduce new 
rules specifically designed to facilitate implementation of the planned 
reforms. 
  
So, what was Feeley’s proposed solution for reforms in the American 
courts?  Instead of bold reforms conceived and initiated from outside the 
judiciary, Feeley proposed that courts should introduce reforms by 
themselves, and posited that litigation would be the main source of such 
changes.  Feeley argued that litigation is well suited to pursue change in 
complex institutions because “[i]t is problem specific . . . [i]t is 
ameliorative . . . [i]t is incremental . . . [a]nd litigation is relatively 
inexpensive.” 13  Feeley warned that “litigation is not a recipe for success,” but 
he still argued that “litigation is especially suited to pursuing changes in the 
legal process.  Here the courts are on their home territory.”14  This argument 
might remind us about his later research on prison reforms through judicial 
policy making in the United States, 15  while observers of the East Asian 
judicial system, particularly those with interest in the independence of 
individual judges in East Asia, may wonder whether they could have similar 
expectations to the courts.16  
  
So, is Feeley’s analytical framework applicable to court reform outside 
the United States?  Will cases outside the United States require any 
modifications to his analytical framework so that it will become more 
generally applicable?  Is litigation preferable to legislation as a vehicle for 
court reform in countries other than the United States?  East Asia offers an 
ideal context for wrestling with these questions because the region recently 
introduced very ambitious steps toward court reform.17 
                                                 
12  Id. 
13  Id. at 214. 
14  Id. (emphasis in original).  
15  See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998). 
16  On the independence of individual judges in Japan, see generally J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. 
RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003); 
Mark A. Levin, Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on Instrumental Judicial Administration in Japan, 
20 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 265 (2011); Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in 
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994). 
17  For publications which cover East Asia as a whole, see, e.g., LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN ASIA: 
JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AND THE INFLUENCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW (John O. Haley & Toshiko Takenaka 
eds., 2014); EAST ASIA’S RENEWED RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE 
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To discuss these questions, I organized a roundtable session titled “East 
Asian Court Reform on Trial” at the 2016 annual meeting of the Law and 
Society Association in New Orleans on June 2, 2016.  Daniel H. Foote, Erik 
Herber, Mari Hirayama, Matthew J. Wilson, and Margaret Y.K. Woo 
responded to my call for participation, and Malcolm Feeley kindly agreed to 
participate as the discussant.  Foote, Herber, Hirayama, and Wilson discussed 
cases from Japan, while Woo discussed cases from Mainland China.  I 
presented my hypothesis about the process of criminal justice reform in East 
Asian countries in the following way in the program book: 
 
It may be the case in East Asian countries, for instance, that the 
process of policy making and policy implementation is strongly 
controlled by the players in the status quo from the very 
beginning, so that only those reforms which are acceptable to 
such players are likely to be introduced, implementation is tightly 
and carefully managed by them, and the introduced reform 
becomes highly routinized with a result than can be evaluated by 
the status quo as a success.18 
  
The discussion was lively, and it seemed only natural to share it with a 
wider audience through publication.  However, having papers on only two 
countries was obviously too narrow for a symposium with East Asia in its 
title.  I wanted to add papers which covered at least South Korea and Taiwan 
as well.  Fortunately, Yong Chul Park agreed to write a paper on South Korea, 
while Kai-Ping Su responded to request for a paper on Taiwan.  Hirayama 
then agreed to turn her presentation into a paper co-authored with me. 
  
Thus, this symposium issue has seven articles, with four on Japan, and 
one each for South Korea, Taiwan, and Mainland China.  The articles are 
presented in the following order: 
 
Daniel H. Foote, Diversification of the Japanese Judiciary 
 
Matthew J. Wilson, Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact of 
Citizen Participation in Serious Criminal Trials in Japan 
 
                                                 
OF LEGAL AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPES IN EAST ASIA (Setsuo Miyazawa et al. eds., 2015). See also issues of 
the ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y. 
18  Printed Program, Law & Soc’y Ass’n 23 (June 2, 2016) 
http://www.lawandsociety.org/NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf. 
6 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 1 
 
Erik Herber, Victim Participation in Japan 
 
Setsuo Miyazawa and Mari Hirayama, Introduction of 
Videotaping of Interrogations and the Lessons of the Imaichi 
Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-Making 
in Japan 
 
Yong Chul Park, Advance Toward “People’s Court” in South 
Korea 
 
Kai-Ping Su, Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan: A Case of 
Fragmented Reform in a Not-Fragmented Court System 
 
Margaret Y.K. Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics 
 
Each article begins with a summary of Feeley’s analytical framework, 
and each author differs slightly in his or her understanding of Feeley’s 
analysis.  Such differences reflect the richness of Feeley’s original analysis. 
  
This symposium concludes with a contribution from Feeley that 
comments on these papers.  His comments will help us generate an analytical 
framework that goes beyond the United States and is applicable to East Asian 
countries.  I hope that this symposium issue will stimulate interest in court 
reform processes in other parts of the world, so that we will eventually have 
an internationally applicable analytical framework for court reform. 
 
